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Abstract: 
 
There is a large and growing interest in the prevailing cross-country differences many 
well-functioning institutions, such as judicial independence and high quality laws, and 
desirable social outcomes, such as a low degree of corruption and high economic 
growth. Influential scholars have claimed that these cross-country differences to a 
large extent are explained by a country’s legal origin (the common law and civil law 
tradition). It is claimed that through mechanisms of a stronger legal protection of 
outside investors and less state intervention, common law countries have developed 
more prosperous economically and socially. This paper proposes an alternative 
interpretation of the cross-country differences observed. Building on scholarly studies 
of state formation processes, the basic proposition of this paper is that state formation 
decisively affects the character of the state infrastructure to be either patrimonial or 
bureaucratic, which in turn affects institutions and social outcomes. This argument is 
tested empirically on a set of 31 OECD countries. It is shown that the state 
infrastructure is indeed more influential than the legal traditions on a set of 
institutional variables (formalism, judicial independence, regulation of entry and case 
law) as well as on a set of social outcomes (corruption, rule of law, and property 
rights). 
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Introduction 
There is a growing body of evidence showing that “rule of law” matters for the wellbeing 
of a society (for a review of the literature, see Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 
2008). Especially the last decade has seen an explosion of literature on the consequences 
of belonging to a certain legal tradition. The so-called Legal Origins Theory (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008) or the Law View (Levine 2005) states that the legal 
traditions established in Europe centuries ago explain contemporary cross-country 
differences in institutions and socio-economic outcomes.  
 
The Legal Origins Theory divides the world in two main legal traditions: the common law 
tradition, which originates from the English law and covers Great Britain and its former 
colonies; and the civil law tradition, which in turn originates from the Roman law and 
includes France and its former colonies and also Scandinavia, Germany and countries 
influenced by the German Law. According to the Legal Origins Theory, common law and 
civil law countries have distinct styles of governmental control of the economic life in a 
society, and different institutions supporting these styles. Through the mechanisms of a 
stronger legal protection of outside investors (mainly property rights) and less state 
intervention, common law countries have developed more prosperous economically and 
socially (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008). This literature has thus given 
theoretical and empirical strength to Hayek’s (1960) classical argument on the advantage 
of English legal institutions over the French ones. 
 
This paper proposes an alternative interpretation of the cross country differences 
uncovered by the Legal Origins Theory. Our argument is historical, and takes its starting 
point from the insights by scholars regarding the formation of the modern state in Europe. 
This paper claims that, in order for a legal tradition, or any specific law, to have any 
impact, an at least semi-functional state is a prerequisite. We take inspiration from Avner 
Greif’s critique of the importance of constitutionalism in economic history, where he 
writes; “policy choices are nothing but a wish without an administration to implement it” 
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(Greif 2007, 1). Following Weber’s (1978) pioneering analysis of bureaucracies, and as 
noted by scholars after him (see for example Ertman 1997, 7-8), this paper’s main 
premise is that the development of a specific state infrastructure is the essential feature in 
the state-building process of a country. That historical moment (between the 16th and 18th 
century for most European countries) represents the critical juncture of our theory. The 
main theoretical argument is that, at that crucial period of state-building, the 
characteristics of the state infrastructure (i.e. directly accountable to the ruler or an 
autonomous bureaucracy) created a path dependency that have the affected posterior 
institutional development of the country (i.e. more state interventionism or less, 
respectively).  
 
As the basis of the empirical analysis, this paper uses the classification suggested by 
Thomas Ertman (1997, 10), who distinguishes between two groups of state 
infrastructures: patrimonial, such as the one developed in France, Spain, Portugal, 
Poland, and Hungary; and the bureaucratic of the German States, Britain, and Denmark. 
 
The making of the modern state is however contested and this paper does not address the 
question of why some countries ended up with a specific kind of state infrastructure. This 
might be because geo-political circumstances (Hintze 1975), the degree of military 
pressure (Tilly 1985; Mann 1986), the timing of the state building process (Ertman 1997), 
the relative power of the ruler and the administrative elite (Greif 2007), or some other 
factor or constellations of factors not explored yet. Our goal is instead to use a common 
observation from these scholars, namely that while some European countries adopted 
administrations that were accountable to the ruler in a direct fashion (patrimonial), other 
developed less directly accountable bureaucracies, populated by meritocraticly appointed 
(instead of patronage-based) civil servants. We argue that the initial state infrastructure 
adopted in a country sets a path dependency because it decisively affects the abilities 
subsequent rulers will have to implement ad hoc opportunistic actions.  
 
It is important to remark here that the paper does not reject the major theoretical 
mechanisms of the Legal Origins Theory, but their main causal factor. Quite the contrary 
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we argue that the state infrastructure may affect social outcomes through the same 
channels as suggested by legal origin scholars (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999; La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008); that is, mainly through protection of the 
property of non-elites. What this paper claims is that the causal factor is not the legal 
system, but the state infrastructure created before the legal traditions were adopted and 
expanded through conquest, colonization and imitation during the 19th century.  
 
A Critique of the Legal Origins Theory  
In a series of very influential articles, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999) have showed a prevailing effect of 
a country’s legal tradition on a large set of desirable institutions, such as judicial 
independence and high quality laws, and social outcomes, such as a low degree of 
corruption and high rates of economic growth. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2008) have later summed up the evidence of those articles – and of the work of many 
other scholars pointing out the empirical relevance of legal traditions for explaining 
nowadays cross-country differences – and suggested what they call the Legal Origins 
Theory. 
 
Following the standard taxonomy in law studies, the Legal Origins Theory establishes a 
clear separation between two distinct legal traditions. First, the Common Law tradition 
originated in England and exported to the British colonies. The Common Law tradition 
relies on legal principles (instead of strictly following codified laws), and on an 
adversarial and oral dispute resolution (instead of an inquisitorial and written one) 
(Glaeser and Shleifer 2002, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008). Second, the 
Civil Law tradition – the oldest and most prevailing in the world – is originally inspired 
from the Roman Law, but usually more identified with Napoleon’s codifications of laws 
in the early 19th century. The goal of the Napoleonic Code was to micro-manage judges’ 
decisions with detailed instructions that eliminated the margin of manoeuvre for judges 
(Levin 2005, 63). Thus, in Civil Law countries judicial discretion is lower and, in 
comparison with Common Law countries, there is “more emphasis on the rights of the 
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state” and “less emphasis on private property rights” (Levine 2005, 65). After Napoleon’s 
codifications, the Civil Law tradition was adopted in all French colonies. Napoleonic 
armies, through conquest, also exported the Civil Law tradition to most Continental 
Europe, including the Iberian colonial powers – Portugal and Spain – who, in turn, 
transplanted to all Latin America and their territories in Africa and Asia. 
 
It is however also important to note that the Civil Law tradition contains several sub 
traditions: French, German, Scandinavian and Socialist. Yet given that there are few non-
French civil law countries and that civil law countries share many structural and 
procedural characteristics, most of the discussion in the literature compares, on one side, 
common law countries and, on the other, civil law ones. As Levine (2005, 63) argues, the 
“sharp distinction” is between these two blocks of countries.1  
 
The Legal Origin Theory claims that rules protecting investors and guaranteeing an equal 
treatment for all economic agents vary systematically among these two legal traditions 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008, 307). The economic effects of legal 
origins have been detected in a large number of dimensions and in a large number of 
studies. The general finding is that, through the protection of property and private 
contracts, Common Law “sets the stage for investment and growth” (Mahoney 2001, 27). 
In one of the most encompassing empirical surveys, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2008) find that Common Law gives investors better protection (which, in turn, 
leads to more financial development), limits state interventionism in the economy (which, 
in turn, leads to lower levels of corruption and smaller unofficial economies), and creates 
less formalized and more independent judiciaries (which in turn secures property rights).  
 
                                                 
1 German and Scandinavian Law become, for Legal Origins Theory scholars, literally “the problem of 
Germany and Scandinavia” (Mahoney 2001: 17). In a continuum with Civil Law on one extreme and 
Common Law in the other, German and Scandinavian Law would lie in-between, clearly closer to the Civil 
Law pole (e.g. the substance of their legal rules is the same), but sharing some characteristics with 
Common Law countries (e.g. a higher independence of judges). Unfortunately, the comparative literature 
does not provide any clear guide on where exactly one could locate those two Civil legal sub-traditions. 
This paper addresses this problem arguing that the “good” characteristics that German and Scandinavian 
countries share with Common Law one (like a higher independence of judges from the executive power) 
are in fact the result of all of them to have developed a bureaucratic state infrastructure (and not a 
patrimonial one) at the moment of state building. 
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This paper finds there are two major strengths in the Legal Origins Theory. First, it has 
develop an increasing and systematic body of empirical evidence showing a significant 
correlation between the legal origin of a country – adopted centuries ago – and a wide 
array of nowadays economic indicators. Controlling for numerous factors, legal origin 
still seems to make an important difference for explaining the asymmetric levels of rule 
of law we see nowadays across countries. Second, legal origins are scientifically 
appealing because they are predominantly exogenous, since they mostly spread through 
conquest and colonization. This is one of the reasons why it has been considered as an 
instrumental variable for explaining cross-country differences in the development of 
financial markets (Levine 1999, La Porta et al. 1998).  In sum, the Legal Origins Theory 
has undoubtedly advanced our understanding on the impact of institutions. Yet, this paper 
finds three major shortcomings that it aims to address with the development of the state 
infrastructure proposition. 
 
First, although legal traditions can be regarded as exogenous for British and French 
colonies, it is difficult to argue the same for the old world. The countries conquered by 
Napoleon were so only for a brief period of time after which they could have resorted to 
their past legal codifications. The Legal Origins Theory must also answer why did the 
colonies of those briefly Napoleon-dominated countries adopt the Civil Law tradition in 
the early 19th century? For instance, the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies took 
advantage of the Napoleon conquest to become partially or completely independent 
political units. It is a problematic to assume, as the Legal Theory Tradition does, that 
while many Portuguese and Spanish colonies (e.g. in Latin America) were breaking with 
their masters, they were compelled to adopt the newly legal system imposed in their 
metropolises by a foreign power. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008, 286) 
argue that the rulers of the new independent nations looked “mainly the French civil law 
…for inspiration”. But the question is why did they copy the country they had just broken 
with instead of, let’s say, the country they wanted to become (e.g. the US)?  
 
The idea of the legal tradition as exogenous becomes even more problematic in the 
adoption of the Civil Law in Japan (in its German version) and in Russia and Turkey (in 
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its French version) in the 19th century. As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008, 
286) admit, this adoption was “largely voluntary”. Similarly, the adoption of Civil Law in 
the large number of countries that have been occupied, dominated or under the influence 
of Japan, Russia and Turkey since the mid-19th century is, as Legal Origins Theory 
authors state, “shaped largely by history”, but also “voluntary” (ibid.). All in all, when 
establishing the foundations of the legal systems of their countries, many (if not most) 
rulers have had a certain margin of manoeuvre. Therefore, the legal tradition a country 
has is – at least, partially, and probably significantly – endogenous to the political system 
and, in particular, to the will of the ruler. It is thus plausible to assume that certain rulers 
(e.g. those with a state interventionist agenda) under certain, institutional, circumstances 
(e.g. lack of checks and balances) may have preferred, for example, the French Civil law 
over the German version or over the Common Law. This paper aims at developing how 
these institutional circumstances are connected to the state formation and what 
consequences this has had for the ulterior institutional evolution of the country. 
 
A second shortcoming of the Legal Origins Theory regards its causal mechanisms. 
Having a closer look, the Legal Origins Theory appears less “legal” that what its name 
indicates. It is not the operations of the judiciary system, or particular judicial decisions 
what seem to mark the key difference between Common Law and Civil Law countries. 
As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008, 286) state, the main problem of civil 
law is that it is associated with a “heavier hand of government” than common law. In 
other words, their main theoretical mechanism is not of legal-judicial nature, but of 
political nature.  
 
Looking at the historical development of legal traditions, one can see how Civil Law was 
a political tool used by Napoleon to expand state interventionism in the French society. 
The goal of the Napoleonic Code was to “strengthen the state” (Levine 2005, 63). In 
codifying laws and procedures and transforming judges into state-employed servants (that 
is, the essence of the Civil Law tradition), the purpose of Napoleon was “to control 
judicial decision in all circumstances” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008, 
304). Napoleon’s Civil Law endeavour was not an isolate reform – or the exogenous 
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result of other reforms – but part of a larger interventionist enterprise, which included 
also the creation of a vast and invasive bureaucracy (Woloch 1994; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer 2008, 304). The Civil Law was the result of a rulers’ political 
strategy. As Legal Origins Theory scholars acknowledge, it developed “because the 
revolutionary generation, and Napoleon after it, wished to use the state power to alter 
property rights and attempted to insure that judges did not interfere” (Mahoney 2001, 
505).  
 
Analyzing Napoleon’s codification of laws uncovers the political dynamics even more. 
Napoleon could choose among several options within the Roman law tradition as a 
source for inspiration. Yet he followed an extreme version – instead of other more 
private-property friendly ones – known as the “Justinian deviation” after eastern Roman 
Emperor Justinian (Dawson 1968; Levine 2005). Emperor Justinian shared the same goal 
with Emperor Napoleon that the state (or, more precisely, the ruler-as-emperor) should 
have a strong ability to shape their societies. In terms of state interventionism, Napoleon 
was continuing what was started by his Bourbon predecessors: Louis XIII (1610-43) and 
specially le Roi Soleil Louis XIV (1643-1715) and the dirigiste policies of his Finance 
Minister Colbert. It is these two kings (and not Napoleon) who are generally regarded as 
the main architects of the strong French state (Berman 2010). Unlike many other rulers 
within the realm of the former Roman Empire (e.g. Italian city states, pre-Bourbon 
France, medieval kingdoms of Aragon and Catalonia), Justinian, Louis XIV, Napoleon, 
and the rulers who voluntarily adopted Civil Law principles, all had a state interventionist 
agenda and were able to implement it. This is precisely the theoretical puzzle that must be 
addressed: why did some rulers have the ability to put in place mechanisms for 
systematic state interventionism while others could not? In order to answer this 
fundamental question we need a theory closer to these political mechanisms, which takes 
the institutions shaped in the state formation process into account. 
 
A third shortcoming of the Legal Origins Theory regards the emergence of the sharp 
distinction between Common and Civil Law countries. There are two main types of 
explanations why this occurred and both have flaws. To start with, inspired by Hayek 
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(1960), several authors consider that common law countries may protect private property 
more than civil law countries as a result of cultural or ideological differences between 
England and France (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1999, Mahoney 
2001, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 2008). According to Hayek (1960), the 
English worldview has traditionally regarded freedom as the absence of coercion while 
the French worldview has preferred to emphasize the “attainment of a social purpose” 
(1960, 58). Therefore, different legal systems would emerge as a result of those distinct 
philosophies of freedom. 
 
The main problem with this account comes from the fact that it hard to distinguish 
between cause and consequence. More precisely, is the higher individualism in England 
the result of a less interventionist state? Or is it the other way around? The scholars who 
argue that “Hayek might be right” (Mahoney 2001, 1) need to provide a convincing 
theory on how cultural values (e.g. social purpose vs. individualism) predated the 
emergence of the English and the French states.   
 
What is more, some authors consider the emergence of the two legal traditions a result of 
certain historical accidents, or critical junctures, at a particular point in time that created a 
robust path dependency. The most prevailing explanation of the differences between 
common law and civil law focuses on the contrast between the political events in 17th 
century England – and, in particular, in the Glorious Revolution – and those in the 18th 
century France (Mahoney 2001, Klerman and Mahoney 2007, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer 2008). Since English lawyers and judges were on the same (and winning) 
side as the property owners in the fight against a proto-absolutist monarchy, they forced 
the Crown to introduce an independent judiciary which could guarantee property rights. 
Accordingly, common law courts gained the ability to review administrative acts. On the 
contrary, the French judiciary was largely monarchist and “ended on the wrong side of 
the French Revolution” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 2008, 303). The members 
of the judiciary should merely be, as Napoleon famously put it, automata who would 
implement codified laws (ibid.). Nevertheless, this standard explanation does not address 
a previous and more fundamental question: why was the French judiciary so relatively 
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monarchist and the English so relatively anti-monarchist? Why, using Mahoney’s (2001, 
11) terms the judges were “heroes” in constitutional development in England and 
“villains” in France? 
 
Other authors choose previous historical moments to point out the differences between 
England and France that ended up producing the two distinctive legal traditions. Again, 
the underlying assumption is that England and France represent the major (and opposite) 
engines for the legal evolution worldwide. For instance, it is argued that the 12th and 
13th centuries were key as to understand English-French differences in their approach to 
law (Dawson 1960, Glaeser and Shleifer 2002). As a consequence of being a relatively 
peaceful country, English nobles, unlike their French counterparts, were capable of 
imposing the Magna Carta (1215) which limited the ability of the Crown and helped 
preserving the independence of the judiciary. Nonetheless, the historical review of the 
period by Avner Greif (2007) seriously weakens this conventional view. Greif casts 
doubts on the ability of Magna Carta to constraint ruler’s behaviour in line with the 
theory presented here. When King John gained enough strength (with the support of the 
Pope and after gathering his own military forces) he invalidated the original 1215 Magna 
Carta and the posterior one (confirmed in 1225) imposed less constrains on the Crown. 
The Magna Carta, like any other constitutional agreement, could not be enforced without 
an external-to-the-king or a weakly-accountable-to-the-king administration. The analysis 
of Greif shows us that the Magna Carta, despite its appeal for scholars given its 
symbolism, cannot be considered as a critical juncture establishing a path dependence 
(i.e. of protection of individual freedoms from Crown’s opportunistic interferences). 
Similar to what is argued in this paper, Greif shows that what prevented English kings 
from abusing property rights was not Magna Carta, but the fact that English kings lacked 
large body of loyal state servants who could put in practice their abuses. 
 
In sum, there are three related shortcomings in the Legal Origins Theory that the theory 
presented in this paper aims to address. In order to build a plausible explanation on the 
impact of past institutions on social outcomes today, we need a theory that, first, provides 
us an historically rooted explanation; second, that describes the political (and not legal) 
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mechanisms through which a “heavier hand of government” is possible in some polities 
and not in others; and third, that offer us a convincing critical juncture that creates a 
robust path dependency able to partially remain unaffected by the individual 
characteristics of posterior rulers and also by the features of different political systems, 
including higher or lower degrees of democracy. 
 
The State Infrastructure Proposition 
Our proposition starts from the premise that the “fundamental dilemma” explaining 
failure and success of societies (North 1981, 25; see also Weingast 1993) is the conflict 
between rulers’ self-interest and economic efficiency. This means that the main problem 
a society faces is that of ‘constraining the king’ (or elected incumbent) to avoid either 
direct confiscations of wealth, the ad hoc modification of property rights, the favourable 
treatment of certain interests or any violation of impartiality. Solving, or to be more 
precise, minimizing that problem is the essence for an efficient operation of markets 
(Miller and Hammond 1994, 5). 
 
The most effective solution according to the predominant political economy literature, 
specially after North and Weingast’s (1989) path-breaking analysis of the Glorious 
Revolution, is a constitutionalism that limits the powers of the executive/ruler (e.g. a 
Parliament such as the one that emerged victorious of the 17th century English civil 
conflicts). Nevertheless, recent developments in economic history have questioned up to 
which extent constitutional rules have a real effect on the consolidation of the rule of law 
in a country. The prevailing constitutional theory (e.g. Weingast 2005) neglects the free 
rider problem, assuming that citizens will coordinate against governmental 
transgressions. As Avner Greif (2006, 2007; Gonzalez de Lara, Greif and Jha 2008) has 
shown using several historical accounts, the separation of powers established in a 
constitution is not self-enforcing. In order to have an effective constraint of rulers’ 
behavior, rulers must “have limited physical capacity to implement policy choices, 
including abuses” (Gonzalez de Lara, Greif and Jha 2008, 2). All rulers (irrespective of 
their personal characteristics and of the nature of their rule) need to delegate to 
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administrators, either to individuals or to organizations, including armies, administrative 
corps, public agencies or private firms or tax farmers.2 It is the limited physical capacity 
of the ruler to control these administrators, and not democratic constitutionalism that 
prevented English kings from abusing their powers.  
 
Regarding this, it is noticeable how the proponents of constitutionalism (e.g. North and 
Weingast 1989 and the large scholarship inspired by their work) almost exclusively focus 
on England, neglecting other less “successful” constitutional monarchies, like Hungary or 
Poland-Lithuania. All three countries were examples of constitutional monarchies 
(Ertman 1997; see also Finer 1997), but Hungary – with constant political and military 
crisis – and Poland – which moved from being the richest Eastern European country in 
the 16th century to be one of the poorest two centuries afterwards – lagged clearly behind 
England’s political and economic success. More generally, there were 25 constitutional 
monarchies and Republics in operation in late 15th century Europe (Herb 2003), and with 
few exceptions (e.g. the Netherlands, England) most of them imploded and were replaced 
by authoritarian and highly interventionist rulers. In other words, it seems implausible to 
believe that constitutionalism contains in itself the ability to constraint the despotic trends 
of rulers.  
 
As we have seen above, Emperor Justinian shared with Napoleon the goal of putting the 
state above the rule of law and private property rights. It is plausible that the same was 
the purpose of many other rulers who opted for the Civil Law, as it for all kind of rulers, 
irrespective of the country or the culture they live in (as the numerous failed absolutist 
attempts in England’s history show). The key difference was that for example the English 
kings could not implement their interventionist plans. To reveal the mechanisms that 
separated English (among other few) kings from their mainstream counterparts, Greif 
(2007) uses narratives from the period of state-building in Europe. As the Spanish 
ambassador in England admitted to his masters the Spanish “Catholic Kings” (Isabella 
                                                 
2 As Bendor, Glazer and Hammond (2001, 235) argue, ‘even God delegates, having told the Israelites after 
they left Egypt: “Behold, I send an Angel before thee, to keep thee in the way, and to bring thee into the 
place which I have prepared. Beware of him, and obey his voice, provoke him not; for he will not pardon 
your transgressions: for my name is in him” 
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and Ferdinand), the English king (Henry VII) “would like to govern England in the 
French fashion but he cannot (…) the difference between us [England] and France 
consists chiefly in this: .. we are [as] remarkable [as they] for good laws, but are 
shamefully neglectful in their execution” (ibid: 34). In other words, the difference 
between England and France did not lay so much in policy-making as in policy-
implementation. As Greif (2007) shows, the English kings, unlike their French 
counterparts, lacked an encompassing and highly accountable administrators ready to 
undertake their (frequently state interventionist) policies.  
 
We use this historically insight by Greif (2007) to make a proposition on how state 
building in Early Modern Europe configured two distinct types of state infrastructure. We 
believe this proposition overcomes many of the problems with the Legal Origins Theory. 
While we agree with La Porta et al regarding the importance in studying “…fundamental, 
or at least historically predetermined variables” (La Porta et al 1999, 230), it is our 
contention that the failure of the Legal Origins Theory to incorporate state formation 
processes hampers our understanding of what actually drives the relationship between 
institutional designs, such as the administrative capabilities, and desirable social 
outcomes, such as low corruption. In sum, we argue that the state formation process 
affects the character of the state infrastructure (patrimonial or bureaucratic), which in turn 
affects institutions such as judicial independence or market regulation, and finally social 
outcomes such as corruption. 
 
Following scholars studying state formations (see for example Ertman 1997; Hinze 1975; 
Tilly 1975; Mann 1986; Ziblatt 2006), but contrary to the Legal Origins Theory we argue 
that state formation processes and different trajectories set off by these processes have 
had far-reaching consequences, which explain the broad cross country patterns that are 
exposed by La Porta et al (1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008).  
 
While there is a great deal of controversy regarding what factors that are affecting the 
state formation process itself – is it geo-political conditions (Hintze 1975), wars (Tilly 
1985), the timing and sequencing of the state formation (Ertman 1997) that explains how 
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these processes play out? – there seems to be reasonably consensus that “state building in 
medieval and early modern Europe [is] capable of explaining variations in political 
regime and administrative and financial infrastructure within the dominant form of the 
territorial state, which account for nearly all of the continent’s polities at the end of the 
early modern period” (Ertman 1997, 4). This paper leaves the controversy regarding the 
roots of state formation aside, while building insights o the profound consequences of 
state formation processes. 
 
In Birth of Leviathan, Thomas Ertman (1997) uses the term state infrastructure as one of 
two dimensions to describe the outcome of the state formation process in the 18th-Century 
Europe (Ziblatt 2006 uses “infrastructural power” to describe a similar phenomenon; see 
also Mann 1986). Following Weber (1978), Ertman (1997) dichotomizes the state 
infrastructure dimension in one patrimonial and one bureaucratic category. In patrimonial 
states positions were filled with patronage-based candidates, selected according to their 
loyalty to the Crown. The officials tended to own their administrative positions, and local 
elites controlled the economy. As the literature on state-building points out, patrimonial 
infrastructures are private and informal patron-client based, but are also easily 
accountable to the ruler (Silberman 1995, Lapuente 2007). In the bureaucratic states, the 
administrative apparatus is “paradoxically, much less accountable in a direct fashion” 
(Silberman 1993, 5) because “principals” (i.e. rulers) are clearly limited to choose the 
“agents” (i.e. civil servants) (Lapuente 2007, 2). Positions in the administration were not 
personal, but filled “with candidates possessing special educational qualifications” 
(Ertman 1997, 9). 
 
As mentioned, there is a lot of controversy in the literature on why some rulers chose (or 
were forced) to work with less directly accountable administrators. Despite that these 
explanations are subject to debate, most authors agree (and this paper with them) on two 
main premises which represent the backbone of our proposition. First, that two distinct 
types of state infrastructure emerged that would fit into the classical division of 
administrations established by Weber: patronage-based or patrimonial and merit-based or 
bureaucratic. Second, that these state infrastructures acquired at the critical moment of 
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state formation create a path dependency difficult to change. The mechanism for that 
robust path dependency would be the following. Once established a patrimonial 
administration, subsequent rulers will not experience many constraints to, in turn, appoint 
core supporters to high, middle, or even low, managerial positions all throughout the 
administrative apparatus (including sometimes the army). On the contrary, once a 
bureaucratic autonomous structure – with selection, promotions and firings 
meritocratically decided – is put in place, it is more difficult for future rulers to bypass it 
or trying to dominate via widespread replacements of civil servants. As Shefter (1977) 
argues, a large “coalition in favour of bureaucratic autonomy” of civil servants and army 
officials (in occasions with external support from social interests groups such as 
professional organizations of business associations) becomes an insurmountable obstacle 
for subsequent rulers aiming at overturn it and make it “directly accountable”.    
  
In those countries where these coalitions of bureaucrats became entrenched, there was a 
fast consolidation of an impersonal law which limits the possibilities for arbitrary 
interventions by the ruler, as noted by the scholars of that period (Ertman 1997, 9). The 
fundamental importance of “impartiality” of government institutions for the quality of 
government (Rothstein and Teorell 2008, 169-173), and of “impersonality” for the 
creation of a social order necessary for the modern state (North, Wallis and Weingast 
2009, 21-27) has been noted by distinguished scholars. Building on there insights it 
seems reasonable that if a state infrastructure has a more “impartial”, or “impersonal” 
character it is not far-fetched to believe that this also affects the institutions and social 
outcomes. 
 
Following Weber (1978) and Ertman (1997), this paper argues that if a state is in a 
patrimonial or a bureaucratic trajectory directly effects the institutions that limit the 
interventions of the ruler and in the second stage the social outcomes. In relation to the 
Legal Origin Theory it is important to note that the mediating variables through which 
legal traditions and state formation should effect institutions and social outcomes are 
basically the same; namely that one type of states with institutions where the ruler have a 
more direct control of the state apparatus (in our case the patrimonial state infrastructure, 
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and for La Porta et al the Civil Law legal tradition) create less judicial independence, 
more procedural formalism, and more controlled economy, which in turn creates weaker 
property rights and more corruption; while in the other type of state (in our case the 
bureaucratic state infrastructure, and for La Porta et al the Common law tradition) rulers’ 
possibilities to intervene are limited by a more autonomous state apparatus which leads to 
more judicial independence, less procedural formalism, and a less controlled economy, 
and therefore stronger property rights and less corruption. 
 
We also note that La Porta et al admit that the state infrastructure should affect 
government efficiency, and thereby the desirable institutions and outcomes, but they fail 
to see the full consequences of this insight (1999, 232). Similar as well to the Economic 
Historians who have described how rulers depend on their administrators, this paper 
agrees that “the rule of law can therefore be a manifestation of equlibria with 
administrators sufficiently powerful to constrain rulers” (González De Lara, Greif and 
Jha 2008, 105). This paper thinks of the relationship between the state infrastructure (a 
historically rooted manifestation of the equilibrium between the ruler and the 
administrators) and institutions and social outcomes in the same way.  
 
Sample, Methods and Data 
In the empirical section we investigate if there is a relationship between the state 
infrastructure (as categorized by Ertman 1997), and on the one hand a set of institutions 
capturing state intervention (procedural formalism, judicial independence, regulation of 
entry, case law), and on the other hand a set of social outcomes closely related to the 
quality of government (corruption, rule of law, and property rights).  
 
Our selection of these two type of variables are based on the following reasons: As we 
have argued in the previous section the Legal Origin Theory and the State Infrastructure 
Proposition both assume that institutions supporting or limiting state interventionism is of 
key importance. According to both theories, it is mainly through “the heavier hand of 
government” that the causal mechanism could be observed (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
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and Shleifer 2008, 286). Consequently, the first group of variables represents the four 
variables most obviously related to this “heavier hand”. The second group of variables 
more directly represents the social outcomes of fundamental importance for a society (for 
the importance of property rights see North 1981; for an overview of the impact of 
quality of government see Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009). Obviously these 
outcomes are inter-related and non-mutually exclusive, yet they cover enough distinct 
conceptual area that we argue it is important to test all three. A full description of the 
dependent variables by source and descriptive statics can be located in the appendix 2. 
 
We analyse the impact of the legal origins and the state infrastructure on the two types of 
variables just described on a stratified sample of OECD countries. It should be noted that 
this is a more limited sample than the sample used by La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 1999; 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008). There are two reasons for using the 
OECD sample only. First, we maintain that it is within this group of countries that legal 
and state origins matter most, and we thus believe that limiting the sample to this groups 
serves as the most apt test between the legal origins models and our theory. Second, 
based on the information provided by Ertman (1997) it is not possible for us to code the 
countries outside the OECD.  
 
A brief note should also be made regarding the coding. As mentioned in the theoretical 
section we use the character of state infrastructure as suggested by Ertman (1997) to 
capture our main independent variable. This variable is dichotomized and the two 
categories are: (0) the patrimonial state infrastructure; and (1) the bureaucratic 
infrastructure. This variable serves the purpose of this paper well, as Ertman’s 
categorization refers to the situation in the 18th-Century, and thus are contemporary to the 
early stage of the industrial revolution and just before the modern state in many OECD 
countries. (A full list of countries, along with their coding can be located in the appendix 
1). 
 
We divide the tests into three different models. The first essentially replicates the La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) design by dividing the sample into four 
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groups of legal origin – Common, Civil (French), Germanic and Scandinavian. The key 
difference is of course we take only OECD countries, whereas they included a number of 
former colonies in most of their analyses. In the second group, we condense the coding of 
La Porta et al into the more typical Common Law/Civil Law dichotomy. Therefore we 
include and show two different types of coding for the Legal Origins Theory. The third 
model represents a test of our theory – the State Infrastructure Proposition. Thus we 
demonstrate side by side the impact of the two different theoretical arrangements in the 
empirical analysis. 
 
In following the design of the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) article, we 
employ a parsimonious empirical design, employing a very straightforward method. We 
follow their format by employing cross-section OLS with robust standard errors with a 
minimum amount of control variables taken from their analyses. With a stratified sample 
such as the OECD there are obviously a number of factors that one has naturally 
controlled for such as a certain level of development and strength of democratic 
institutions. We thus begin with a simple baseline model regressing only GDP per capita 
(log) on all models. In the second set of dependent variables (the so called ‘outcomes’) 
we then extend each baseline model by including three additional control variables.  The 
first is a control for ‘union density’ from Botero et al (2004). Next we control for 
‘proportional representation’ which is taken from the Database of Political Institutions 
(Beck et al 2006). Finally, as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) do, we also 
test the relevance of ‘left power’, which is taken from Botero et al (2001).   
 
Empirical results 
We test the effects of legal traditions and state infrastructure on the institutions indicating 
state interventionism in Table 1. In models 1-3 we test the our hypothesis on one aspect 
of government regulation, namely ‘regulation of entry’, which measure the number of 
steps (log) it takes to start a new business (from Djankov et al 2002), which is measured 
in our sample from .65 (Canada) to 2.71 (Mexico), with higher numbers equating to more 
regulation.  In model 1, the control group is Common law countries, as coded by La 
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Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). Thus French civil law countries have 1.27 
more steps on average than common law countries, while Germanic Law and 
Scandinavian Law countries have roughly ‘1’and 0.24 steps greater than the control 
group respectively. In model 2 we use the condensed version of the Legal Origins theory 
and employ a dummy variable with Common Law countries equalling ‘1’. We thus find 
that Common Law countries have roughly 0.9 steps less than Civil Law countries and the 
difference is significant at the 95% level of confidence.  
 
***Table 1 about here*** 
 
However, looking at model 3 we find that difference between patrimonial and 
bureaucratic countries is even greater, with the latter group of countries having a full one-
step less for new entrepreneurs to start a business than in patrimonial countries. 
 
Moving to models 4-12, we examine the impact of the two theories on judicial 
institutions. Beginning with models 4-6, we find again that both legal traditions and state 
infrastructure have strong and statistically significant explanatory power with respect to 
their impact on formalism of courts. This variable ranges in our data from 1.57 (New 
Zeland) to 5.24 (Spain). Common Law countries have significantly lower formalism of 
their courts on average relative to French, German and Scandinavian Law countries 
(Model 1) as well as in model 4, when the three groups are collapsed into one in model 5.  
We find strong evidence for bureaucratic states having lower formalism of the courts as 
well, with the .95 coefficient being significant at the 99% level of confidence.   
 
‘Tenure of Judges’ and ‘Case Law’ range from 0.5-1 and 0-1 respectively in our data.  As 
is the case in Models 1-6, we find that both the Legal Origins Theory and the state 
infrastructure have strong and statistically significant explanatory power on these two 
judicial institutions. However, like models 1-3, the dummy variable representing state 
infrastructure is larger than the Common Law coefficient and the variance explained in 
Models 9 and 12 is almost twice that of the variance explained in models 8 and 11, using 
the Common Law dummy variable. 
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***Table 2 about here*** 
 
Next we move over to Table 2, where we examine of the impact of state and legal 
institutions on so called ‘quality of government’ (QoG) outcome variables, namely 
corruption, rule of law, and property rights. Here we begin each test with a simple 
baseline model as we did in Table 1, using GDP to capture differences in development.  
Yet for each baseline model, we also include a series of controls, as described in the 
previous section. Models 1-6 in Table 2 elucidate the effects of legal traditions and state 
infrastructure on the World Bank’s ‘control of corruption’ variable. Models 1-4 show the 
impact of legal origins on corruption, and we find that French civil law countries are 
significantly more corrupt than common law ones, yet there is no statistically meaningful 
difference between Germanic, Scandinavian and Common Law countries as defined by 
LPLV with respect to corruption (see Model 2). Models 3 and 4 show that Common Law 
countries are less corrupt by 0.4 and 0.7 standard deviations of the dependent variable 
and the difference is 95% and 99% statistically significant respectively in the two models.  
However, when looking at state infrastructure, we find that bureaucratic countries are 
almost a full standard deviation less corrupt on average (see model 6) than their 
patrimonial counterparts. 
 
In models 7-12, we find the evidence for the Legal Origins Theory much weaker than in 
previous models. In models 1 and 2, only the French civil law countries are significantly 
less than Common Law countries, and the coefficient is only significant at the 90% level 
of confidence when all control variables are included. Likewise for the Common Law 
dummy variable in Model 4. However, we find relatively large coefficients along with 
strong statistical significance in models 11 and 12, testing the difference between 
patrimonial and bureaucratic states with respect to property rights. 
 
Looking at a broader indicator of the rule of law (from the World Bank’s Governance 
Indicators), we find even stronger evidence of the superior explanatory power of the State 
Infrastructure proposition relative to the Legal Origins Theory. While French civil law 
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systems exhibit significantly lower levels of the rule of law than Common Law, by 
roughly one third and one half of a standard deviation in the dependent variable, we find 
no evidence to suggest that the other two groupings in the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2008) design have any meaningful difference with Common Law countries.  
Moreover, in models 15 and 16 when we examine the dichotomous relationship between 
Common Law and non-Common law, we find no difference in the rule of law at all in 
either model. Yet models 17 and 18 demonstrate again that bureaucratic states one again 
significantly outperform the patrimonial countries with respect to outcomes, by roughly 
0.5 standard deviations of the dependent variable. 
 
Up to this point, we have done separate tests of the State and Legal Origins hypotheses 
on a number of institutional and outcome variables. This is due to a significant level of 
multicollinearity between our ‘bureaucratic’ dummy variable and some of the coding for 
legal traditions. Table 3 shows our state origin’s correlation with the legal tradition 
variables. 
 
***Table 3 about here*** 
 
We find as expected that our ‘bureaucratic’ variable is significantly correlated with the 
UK Common variable, along with the LPLS French and Scandinavian Law countries.  
The correlations with the Common law and LPLS French countries are both over 0.5, 
which in a relatively small sample, may seriously cloud the relationship of one or more of 
the variables in any given OLS regression. However, we run just a set of simple tests 
using only the outcome variables of the greatest interest in this analysis, the QoG 
outcome variables.   
 
***Table 4 About here*** 
  
Table 4 shows the head to head comparison of the affect on QoG variables between the 
state and legal origins variables. Based on the consistently poor significant levels of the 
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other three control variables in Table 2, we include only GDP per capita (Log) in models 
1-6 in Table 4. We run two models with each dependent variable, one which runs the 
bureaucratic variables against the standard common law dummy variable used to indicate 
legal systems, and then a second model which runs the bureaucratic variables against the 
more detailed LPLS coding from their 2008 publication. Here we find that in each model, 
the state origins variables remain significant at the 99% level of confidence in each of the 
six models with coefficients all in the expected (positive) direction. However, none of the 
legal origins variables remain significant in any of the 6 models, suggesting a stronger 
explanatory power in the state origins explanation empirically.  
 
***Figure 1 about here*** 
 
In figures 1-3, we take a closer look at the differences between the Common/Civil and 
patrimonial/bureaucratic groups with respect to quality of government outcomes.  In 
Figure 1, we examine relative gaps between the two groups as regards to corruption.   
Again, the World Bank variables are standardized, with a standard deviation of ‘1’.  
Looking at the simple bi-variate averages, we thus that the gap between Common and 
Civil is 0.7 standard deviations, in favour of Common law countries as the Legal Origins 
Theory would predict. However, the gap between bureaucratic and patrimonial countries 
is roughly 1.3 standard deviations in the data, demonstrating stronger explanatory power 
in accounting for variance in corruption within the OECD sample. 
 
***Figure 2 about here*** 
***Figure 3 about here*** 
 
Figure 2 shows us similar results in that we find that Common outperforms Civil with 
respect to property rights and that the difference is roughly full standard deviation in the 
data (0.79), however the gap is approximately 50% wider between patrimonial and 
bureaucratic countries, with the latter group having a an average property rights score of 
about 1.5 standard deviations higher than the former. Figure 3 again shows the same 
pattern, with the gap between bureaucratic and patrimonial (roughly 0.9 standard 
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deviations of the rule of law variable) being almost twice as large as the gap between 
Civil and Common Law countries (about 0.5 standard deviations). 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has suggested an alternative and historically rooted interpretation of the 
empirical patterns observed by La Porta et al. (La Porta et al 1997, 1998, 1999; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008, 302). While their Legal Origins Theory consider 
well-functioning institutions, such as judicial independence, and desirable social 
outcomes, such as low corruption, to be the result of a country’s legal tradition, this paper 
has claimed that they are affected instead by the type of state infrastructure established 
during the crucial period of state formation process.  
 
This paper has pointed out three shortcomings in the Legal Origins Theory. First, one can 
question how historically well rooted their explanation is, and, in particular, up to which 
extent the dynamics of legal adoption were exogenous to state-builders’ self-interest. 
Second, the basic causal mechanism of the Legal Origins Theory is political, rather than 
legal, and thus the theoretically relevant issue is to explain why certain rulers opted for 
certain versions within long-lasting wide legal frameworks. Third, the Legal Origins 
Theory does not offer a clear convincing critical juncture that creates a path dependency.  
 
We believe these shortcomings have been addressed in this paper. Building on scholarly 
studies of state formation processes (Ertman 1997; Greif 2007; Mann 1986; Tilly1985; 
Weber 1978), the basic idea of the state infrastructure proposition posed here is that state 
formation process decisively affects the character of the state infrastructure (patrimonial 
or bureaucratic), which in turn affects institutions and social outcomes. Our empirical 
analysis demonstrates that the state infrastructure is indeed more influential than the legal 
traditions on a set of institutional variables (formalism, judicial independence, regulation 
of entry and case law) as well as on a set of social outcomes (corruption, rule of law, and 
property rights). 
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This paper also maintains that even if both legal traditions and the state infrastructure are 
affecting institutions and social outcomes it is probable that the state infrastructure is 
more fundamental. To get some sense of what we should expect to come first in time, we 
can consider the policy implications from the Legal Origins Theory and what we call the 
state infrastructure proposition for states in the making, such as today’s Afghanistan or 
Iraq. There is an increasing consensus that the mere importation of Western constitutional 
and legal rules, including democratic institutions, has fell short of the initial expectations. 
A growing number of analysts point out towards state building – and, in particular, 
towards the enactment of a merit-based non-corrupt bureaucracy – as the key reform that 
should have gained much more pre-eminence in the process of rebuilding both countries 
from the very beginning. It should be self evident that the mere introduction of common 
law (like the adoption of a democratic constitution) without a state building process 
before it would not have the desired consequences for the economic and social life in 
Afghanistan. As Sheri Berman (2010) notes, it is not so much Western countries’ 
adoption of constitutional or legal rules what should inspire the current efforts to rebuild 
Afghanistan, but it is “Early modern Europe, for example – the birthplace of the modern 
state – [which] offers numerous lessons for contemporary policymakers to ponder”. In 
line with this argument it is the contention of this paper that the creation of a bureaucratic 
state infrastructure – which in itself might be hard or even impossible to accomplish – is 
of primary importance also today. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: The Impact of State Infrastructure and Legal Origins on Government regulation & Judicial Institutions 
       
Government Regulation - Regulation of Entry Judicial Institutions - Formalism Check Collection 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
French 1.27***   1.44***     
 (7.36)   (4.43)     
German 1.04***   1.33***     
 (7.15)   (4.62)     
Scandinavian 0.24*   0.94**     
 (1.71)   (2.90)     
Common  -0.89***    -1.27***   
  (-5.40)    (-5.19)   
Bureaucracy   -0.99***     -0.95*** 
   (-5.87)     (-2.99) 
GDP(log) -0.18 -0.45 0.06 -0.24 -0.35 -0.02 
 (-1.46) (-2.89) 0.39 (-.59) (-.92) (-0.03) 
Obs.  29 29 29 30 30 30 
Rsq. 0.83 0.59 0.65 0.48 0.45 0.32 
              
Judicial Institutions - Tenure of Judges Judicial Institutions - Case Law 
  7 8 9 10 11 12 
French -0.13     -0.92***     
 (-1.41)     (-8.75)     
German -0.31**     -0.19     
 (-2.49)     (-1.01)     
Scandinavian -0.01     0.03     
 (-0.49)     (0.74)     
Common   0.14**     0.41***   
   -2.48     (3.27)   
Bureaucracy     0.23**     0.59** 
     -2.14     -2.76 
GDP(log) 0.09 0.1 -0.04 -0.41* 0.05 -0.28 
 (0.62) (0.68) (-0.25) (-1.87) (0.19) (-1.01) 
Obs.  25 25 25 25 25 25 
Rsq. 0.32 0.13 0.25 0.65 0.15 0.28 
Note: Sample limited to OECD countries only. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
*** p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 2: Quality of Government Outcome Variables     
      Corruption     
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
French -0.63** -0.88***     
  (-2.96) (-3.69)     
German -0.55** -0.75     
  (-2.75) (-2.91)     
Scandinavian 0.13 -0.09     
  (0.66) (0.22)     
Common   0.40** 0.73***   
    (2.09) (3.24)   
Bureaucracy     0.85*** 0.95*** 
      (6.74) (5.62) 
GDP(log) 1.24*** 1.28*** 1.44*** 1.54*** 0.98*** 0.85*** 
  (7.80) (4.33) (9.04) (7.36) (6.84) (3.91) 
Left Power  -0.09  0.38  -0.16 
   (-0.22)  (1.25)  (-0.67) 
Prop. Rep.  0.17  0.18**  0.03 
   (1.68)  (2.11)  (0.38) 
Union Density  -0.58  0.18  0.07 
   (-1.19)  (0.44)  (0.22) 
Obs. 31 28 31 28 31 28 
Rsq. 0.81 0.83 0.72 0.79 0.87 0.88 
        
     Property Rights     
  7 8 9 10 11 12 
French -0.62*** -0.59*     
 (-3.02) (-1.83)     
German -0.53** -0.45     
 (-2.44) (-1.63)     
Scandinavian -0.02 -0.25     
 (-0.18) (-0.57)     
Common   0.42** 0.48*   
   (2.60) (1.82)   
Bureaucracy     0.83*** 0.81*** 
      (6.11) (4.33) 
GDP(log) 1.22*** 1.32*** 1.37*** 1.42*** 0.98*** 0.80*** 
 (6.77) (4.34) (6.98) (5.89) (8.01) (4.76) 
Left Power  -0.003  0.19  -0.26 
  (-0.01)  (0.56)  (-0.99) 
Prop. Rep.  0.04  0.04  -0.04 
  (0.36)  (0.40)  (-1.03) 
Union Density  0.26  0.48  0.38 
  (0.48)  (1.28)  (1.24) 
Obs. 31 28 31 28 31 28 
 27
Rsq. 0.73 0.77 0.68 0.77 0.84 0.87 
      Rule of Law     
  13 14 15 16 17 18 
French -0.35** -0.46**     
 (-2.14) (-2.04)     
German -0.15 -0.20     
 (-0.94) (-0.91)     
Scandinavian 0.15 0.29     
 (1.15) (0.86)     
Common   0.14 0.23   
   (0.95) (1.06)   
Bureaucracy     0.50*** 0.53*** 
     (6.36) (4.18) 
GDP(log) 1.13*** 1.13*** 1.23*** 1.35*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 
 (8.58) (5.49) (7.92) (7.22) (8.51) (4.58) 
Left Power  -0.26  0.15  -0.15 
  (-0.85)  (0.67)  (-0.68) 
Prop. Rep.  0.08  0.08  0.04 
  (1.09)  (1.04)  (0.70) 
Union Density  -0.46  0.04  -0.04 
  (-1.46)  (0.14)  (-0.15) 
Obs. 31 28 31 28 31 28 
Rsq. 0.84 0.87 0.78 0.81 0.89 0.89 
Note: corruption is an average of the World Bank score from 1996-200 (taken from LPSV 2008), property 
rights is an index from the Heritage Foundation (1-5) from 2004, and rule of law is the average  from the 
World Bank ( between 2002-2006).  All QoG dependent variables are coded so that higher values equal 
better QoG.  Sample limited to OECD countries only. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
*** p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 3: Correlations Among Legal and State Origins Coding: OECD Sample  
            
 Common Law (0/1) LPLS Ukcommon LPLS French LPLS German LPLS Scandinavian 
Bureaucratic (0/1) 0.51 0.51 -0.53 -0.26 0.45 
note: bold numbers represent a significant correlation of 95% or greater.     
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Table 4: Legal vs. State Origins and Quality of Government Outcomes   
       
 Corruption Rule of Law Property rights 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bureaucracy 0.91*** 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.51*** 0.42*** 
 (7.70) (6.39) (5.76) (5.23) (7.08) (6.13) 
Common -0.07  0.06  -0.08  
 (-0.42)  (0.73)  (-0.78)  
French  0.03  -0.02  -0.05 
  (0.12)  (-0.11)  (-0.43) 
German  -0.06  -0.05  0.09 
  (-0.33)  (-0.66)  (0.78) 
Scandinavian  0.16  -0.06  0.11 
  (0.87)  (-0.68)  (0.86) 
GDP(log) 0.90*** 0.94*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 1.01*** 
 (7.86) (6.37) (7.60) (8.26) (8.05) (8.06) 
       
Obs.  31 31 31 31 31 31 
Rsq. 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.89 0.90 
Note: corruption is an average of the World Bank score from 1996-200 (taken from LPSV 2008), property rights is an 
index from the Heritage Foundation (1-5) from 2004, and rule of law is the average  from the World Bank ( between 
2002-2006).  All QoG dependent variables are coded so that higher values equal better QoG.  Sample limited to OECD 
countries only. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
*** p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Appendix 1  
Coding of Sample 
OECD  Original LPLV Common Law 
State 
infrastructure 
country    Coding  Dummy  Dummy 
Australia  Common 1  1 
Austria  German  0  1 
Belgium  Civil (Fr.) 0  0 
Canada  Common 1  1 
Switzerland German  0  1 
Czech Republic German  0  0 
Germany German  0  1 
Denmark Scandinavian 0  1 
Spain  Civil (Fr.) 0  0 
Finland  Scandinavian 0  1 
France  Civil (Fr.) 0  0 
United Kingdom Common 1  1 
Greece  Civil (Fr.) 0  0 
Hungary German  0  0 
Ireland  Common 1  1 
Iceland  Scandinavian 0  1 
Italy  Civil (Fr.) 0  0 
Japan  German  0  0 
Korea, Rep. German  0  0 
Luxembourg Civil (Fr.) 0  0 
Mexico  Civil (Fr.) 0  0 
Netherlands Civil (Fr.) 0  1 
New Zealand Common 1  1 
Norway  Scandinavian 0  1 
Poland  German  0  0 
Portugal  Civil (Fr.) 0  0 
Slovak Republic German  0  0 
Slovenia  German  0  0 
Sweden  Scandinavian 0  1 
Turkey  Civil (Fr.) 0  0 
United States Common 1  1 
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Appendix 2  
Data and Sources 
 
Regulation of Entry (Djankov et al. 2002.) - The number of steps to start a new business (log).  Mean: 
1.85, St. Dev: 0.65, Min: 0.69, Max: 2.71. 
 
Formalism Check Collection (Djankov et al. 2003) – Based on an index built from data from a survey 109 
countries inquiring about legal procedures regarding the eviction of a residential tenant for non-payment of 
rent and the collection of a check returned for non-payment.  Mean: 3.28, St. Dev: 0.83, Min: 1.57, Max: 
5.25. 
 
Tenure of Judges (La Porta et al. 2004) - Measures the tenure of judges in the highest court in 
any country. The variable takes three possible values: 1 if tenure is life-long, 0.5 if tenure is more than six 
years but not life-long, and 0 if tenure is less than six years.  Mean: 0.88, St. Dev: 0.22, Min: 0, Max: 1. 
 
Case Law (La Porta et al. 2004) - A dummy taking value 1 if judicial decisions in a given country are a 
source of law, 0 otherwise.  Mean: 0.68, St. Dev: 0.47, Min: 0, Max: 1. 
 
Corruption (World Bank – Kaufmann et al 2008) – a composite index of international risk assessments, 
NGO’s, IGO’s and citizen surveys measuring the extent to which corruption is perceived to be present in a 
given country.  We take the average between 2002 and 2006.  Mean: 0, St. Dev: 1, Min: -2.5, Max: 2.5.  
OECD sample:  Mean: 1.43, St. Dev: 0.82, Min: --0.39, Max: 2.4.   
 
Property rights (Heritage Foundation 2004) - A rating of property rights in each country in 1997 (on a 
scale from 1 to 5). The more protection private property receives, the higher the score. The score is based, 
broadly, on the degree of legal protection of private property, the extent to which the government protects 
and enforces laws that protect private property, the probability that the government will expropriate private 
property, and the country’s legal protection of private property.   Mean: 4.35, St. Dev: .79, Min: 3, Max: 5 
 
Rule of Law (World Bank – Kaufmann et al 2008) - a composite index of international risk assessments, 
NGO’s, IGO’s and citizen surveys measuring the strength of the rule of law in a given country by such 
aspects as independence of courts, trust in police, level of organized crime, strength of property rights and 
contract enforcement, and human trafficking.  .  Mean: 0, St. Dev: 1, Min: -2.5, Max: 2.5.  OECD sample:  
Mean: 1.30, St. Dev: 0.63, Min: --0.38, Max: 1.97.   
 
GDP per capita (log) (- World Development Indicators) - GDP per capita in Purchasing Power terms.  
Various years following La Porta et al (2008) 
 
Proportionality (Beck et al 2006) - Index of proportional representation.  Equals 2 plus 1 if candidates are 
elected based on the percent  of votes received by their party  ("pr") minus 1 if legislators are elected using 
a winner-take-all / first past the post rule ("pluralty") minus 1 if most seats are plurality ("housesys").  
Average of 1975-2000. 
 
Union density (Botero et al. 2004) – Measures the percentage of the total workforce affiliated to labour 
unions in 1997. 
 
Left Power (Botero et al. 2004) - Chief executive and largest party in congress have left or center political 
orientation.  
 
 
